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INTRODUCTION
Roughly 95% of felony convictions are obtained through guilty pleas
rather than trials.1 Despite the integral role of plea bargains in our criminal
justice system, however, the Supreme Court has declined to create a
separate standard for determining whether a defendant’s Sixth Amendment
right to counsel2 has been violated in the guilty plea context. Instead, the
two-prong test for determining whether counsel was ineffective at trial,
developed in Strickland v. Washington,3 governs.4 In Strickland, the
Supreme Court held that a defendant’s right to effective counsel is not
violated as long as counsel’s performance does not fall “below an objective
standard of reasonableness”5 and prejudice the defendant by affecting the
outcome of the proceeding.6
Surprisingly, in Hill v. Lockhart, the Court decided that the Strickland
test was likely to function properly in the guilty plea context.7 The Court
concluded this despite concerns both that guilty pleas are less likely to be
fully investigated than trials, and that counsel’s responsibilities in the plea
context involve more unreviewable “off the record” activities such as
advising the accused and negotiating with the prosecution than it does on
“on the record” reviewable actions. Nonetheless, the Court extended the
Strickland test to the guilty plea context in Hill with one slight alteration:
the first prong of Strickland remains the same, but the second prong
requires that a defendant allege that but for his attorney’s deficient
performance, he would have gone to trial rather than plead guilty.8 This
Comment focuses on this second “prejudice” prong of the Strickland–Hill
test.
Determining the effect of counsel’s performance based on the outcome
of a trial is difficult and subjective. The challenge is amplified in the plea
setting. Guilty pleas produce thin records and leave little support for a
defendant’s claim of prejudice. Additionally, courts tend to rely heavily on
1

In 2006, 94% of felony convictions in state courts were obtained through guilty pleas. See Bureau
of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Table 5.46.2006, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
STATISTICS ONLINE, http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5462006.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2011).
In 2008, 97% of felony convictions in federal district courts were obtained through guilty pleas. See
Admin. Office, U.S. Courts, Table 5.24.2008, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS ONLINE,
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5242008.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2011).
2
U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have
the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”).
3
466 U.S. 668 (1984).
4
See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58–59 (1985) (adopting the two-prong Strickland test to
determine whether counsel is ineffective in the guilty plea context).
5
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.
6
Id. at 694 (“The defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”).
7
474 U.S. at 58–59.
8
Id. at 59.
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rote assurances from the defendant at the time a plea is entered, stating that
the plea is voluntary, and stating that she was not promised anything that
was not disclosed to the court in exchange for her plea.9 These assurances
provide a method of “reversal proofing” guilty pleas; the underlying
purpose of establishing this record is to ensure that the defendant’s plea is
voluntary and entered with knowledge of its consequences.
In its mandatory adoption of the Strickland–Hill standard, Illinois has
tipped the scales even further in the direction of reversal-proofing pleas by
requiring a defendant to do one of two things to satisfy the prejudice prong
of the Strickland test: (1) raise a claim of innocence, or (2) raise a defense
that he could have raised at trial.10 The purpose of this requirement is to
demonstrate that, absent counsel’s deficient performance, the defendant
would have gone to trial and had a high probability of being acquitted.
Rather than focusing on the factors that influenced the defendant’s decision
to enter a plea, the Illinois standard centers on the predicted outcome of a
hypothetical trial.
This standard creates an almost insurmountable hurdle for a defendant
who receives ineffective assistance when pleading guilty. The Illinois
standard sets such a high bar that it effectively guarantees a fundamentally
fair process only to those defendants who are actually innocent. This
guarantee does not satisfy the Sixth Amendment and fails to meet the goals
of the Strickland test.11
While it would of course be permissible for Illinois courts to require
more of defense counsel and provide greater protection to defendants than
does Strickland,12 it is not permissible to deny defendants the full scope of
protection guaranteed by Strickland and insulate deficient performance
from review. The Strickland–Hill version of the prejudice prong requires a
defendant to show that she would have gone to trial but for counsel’s
deficient performance.13 Because the Illinois prejudice prong effectively

9

See Preliminary Proceedings: Guilty Pleas, 38 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 403, 412–13
(2009). A plea that is negotiated by the prosecution and defense, whether partially or fully negotiated, is
not binding on the trial court; the trial court still must agree to the sentence. Id. at 407. A defendant
may withdraw her plea if the trial court rejects the negotiated agreement. Id. at 409. However, when
there is not a negotiated agreement between the parties and a blind plea is entered, a defendant is not
entitled to withdraw her plea if the court does not follow a recommended sentence or sentencing range.
Id. at 408.
10
See People v. Rissley, 795 N.E.2d 174, 205 (Ill. 2003).
11
See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. The Court noted that the Sixth Amendment was designed
“simply to ensure that criminal defendants receive a fair trial.” To this end, the Strickland test was
designed to allow a court to make a fair assessment of counsel’s conduct by evaluating the challenged
conduct, from counsel’s perspective, at the time it occurred. See id.
12
See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Five Views of Federalism: “Converse-1983” in Context, 47 VAND.
L. REV. 1229, 1244 (1994) (“[T]he federal Constitution . . . establishes a minimum baseline—a floor—
that state judges must respect upon penalty of reversal. But the floor need not become a ceiling.”).
13
Hill, 474 U.S. at 59.
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requires innocence, therefore lowering the “floor” set by Strickland, it is
unconstitutional.
At a minimum, Illinois needs to realign with the standard established
by Strickland–Hill. Alternatively, a new standard for determining whether
a defendant has been denied effective assistance when pleading guilty
should be adopted. An appropriate standard could take a number of forms,
and should align the defendant’s burden of proof with the Strickland-Hill
test. Alternatives developed for application in the plea context will
encourage counsel to provide defendants with effective assistance while
maintaining the finality of properly entered guilty pleas.
Part I of this Comment examines the relationship between guilty pleas
and ineffective assistance of counsel. It discusses the prevalence of guilty
pleas in both state and federal courts and explains the relationship between
the requirement that a plea be entered knowingly and voluntarily and the
standards for ineffective assistance. Part II focuses on the development of
the Strickland standard and its extension to guilty pleas in Hill. Part III
examines the adoption of the Strickland–Hill standard in Illinois and traces
the origins of the additional requirements that the Illinois Supreme Court
has incorporated into the prejudice prong. It argues that Illinois should
align its interpretation of the Strickland–Hill prejudice prong more closely
with the underlying goals of fundamental fairness and accuracy identified in
Strickland and Hill. Finally, Part IV alternatively suggests that even if the
approach adopted in Illinois is constitutional, the Supreme Court should
adopt a standard that is more administrable in the guilty plea context to
replace the Strickland–Hill test.
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE AND GUILTY
PLEAS
Because an overwhelming percentage of defendants resolve their cases
through guilty pleas, representation by counsel in the guilty plea process
likely constitutes the most important service a lawyer provides for his
client.14
Section A explains that the vast majority of felony convictions are
obtained through guilty pleas. Section B dispels the misconception that all
defendants who plead guilty do so because they are actually guilty and are
certain to be convicted at trial. Finally, Section C discusses the
I.

14

Defendants are entitled to counsel in plea proceedings because the process is considered to be
adversarial in nature. See Trials: Right to Counsel, 38 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 491, 491
(2009). The Constitution requires the government to ensure that proceedings which may deprive an
accused of his freedom are conducted fairly. See JAMES J. TOMKOVICZ, THE RIGHT TO THE ASSISTANCE
OF COUNSEL: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 155–56 (2002) (“Lawyers
ensure that the adversarial system functions as a true ‘confrontation between adversaries.’ They
promote the interests of the defendant and subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful ‘adversarial
testing.’” (quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656–57 (1984))).
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interrelatedness of guilty pleas and ineffective assistance of counsel by
explaining that pleas are required to be both “voluntarily” and
“intelligently” entered and that ineffective assistance of counsel may render
a defendant’s plea involuntary.
A. Prevalence of Guilty Pleas
Nearly 95% of convictions are obtained through guilty pleas.15 In
Illinois, the percentage of convictions achieved through guilty pleas is
slightly below the national average—roughly 86% in the state overall and
70% in Cook County.16 The prevalence of the use of guilty pleas is not a
recent trend, and actually predates the establishment of the ineffective
assistance of counsel standard.17 The Supreme Court has acknowledged
both the prevalence of guilty pleas and that “[s]tate[s] to some degree
encourage[] pleas of guilty at every important step in the criminal
process.”18
B. Misconceptions Surrounding Guilty Pleas
One might assume that few innocent defendants plead guilty.
However, anecdotal evidence suggests that some portion of innocent
defendants who are accused of a crime plead guilty despite their
innocence.19 Put more frankly, “once a person is facing felony charges, the
issue no longer is whether he did the crime; it’s how to limit the damage.”20
A former prosecutor explained, “A wise defendant, with the help of his
lawyer, thinks pragmatically . . . . Sometimes trials bring surprises—

15

See Bureau of Justice Statistics, supra note 1.
In 2006, 51,766 convictions on felony charges occurred through guilty pleas in the circuit courts
of Illinois, 9694 convictions were reached through bench trials, and another 715 were convicted by
juries. ADMIN. OFFICE, ILL. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS COURTS: STATISTICAL
SUMMARY 59 (2006), available at http://www.state.il.us/court/SupremeCourt/AnnualReport/2006/Stat/
2006%20Statistical%20Summary.pdf. In Cook County, which encompasses the city of Chicago and
surrounding suburbs, 19,343 convictions occurred through guilty pleas, 9094 were reached through
bench trials, and 280 were convicted by juries. Id.
17
See DONALD J. NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE
WITHOUT TRIAL 3 (Frank J. Remington ed., 1966) (“[T]he trial is not the most common method of
convicting or acquitting defendants. Roughly 90 per cent of all criminal convictions are by pleas of
guilty . . . .”).
18
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 750 (1970).
19
See, e.g., SAMUEL R. GROSS ET AL., EXONERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES: 1989 THROUGH
2003 12 (2004), available at http://www.soros.org/initiatives/usprograms/focus/justice/articles_
publications/publications/exonerations_20040419/exon_report.pdf (noting that nineteen of 329
exonerees in the study’s database pled guilty to avoid the risk of life imprisonment or the death penalty).
20
STEVE BOGIRA, COURTROOM 302: A YEAR BEHIND THE SCENES IN AN AMERICAN CRIMINAL
COURTHOUSE 334 (2005) (quoting statements made during an interview with Kevin Bolger, a criminal
defense attorney and former prosecutor practicing at Chicago’s Cook County Criminal Courthouse).
16
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surprises that turn the flimsiest cases into convictions . . . . So you get the
best deal you can and you get out of there.”21
The reasons that defendants enter guilty pleas are varied. In many
cases, a plea provides advantages to both the defendant and the prosecution.
The defendant may limit or reduce her sentence while starting the
correctional process immediately.22 The prosecution may conserve scarce
resources and avoid the risk that the state could not sustain its burden of
proof at trial.23
There is no way to determine what proportion of guilty pleas is entered
by defendants who are not guilty. “It is well known . . . that many
defendants who can’t afford bail plead guilty in return for short sentences,
often probation and credit for time served, rather than stay in jail for months
and then go to trial and risk much more severe punishment if convicted.”24
According to one study, defendants who initially pleaded guilty and were
later exonerated make up only about 6% of exonerees.25 However, the
existence of such cases suggests that pleading guilty does not always
reliably signify actual guilt. Additionally, because pleading guilty can
make innocence more difficult to establish at an eventual trial than it would
otherwise have been, the proportion of exonerees in this category may be
artificially low.26
C. Requirement that Pleas Are Entered into “Voluntarily and Intelligently”
When entering a guilty plea,27 a defendant must stand in open court and
enter an admission that she committed the charged acts for which she is
pleading guilty.28 Because these actions require the defendant to waive his
21

Id. (internal quotation mark omitted).
Brady, 397 U.S. at 751–52; see also NEWMAN, supra note 17, at 96 (“The victim of a crime is
often as reluctant to be exposed to the publicity and trauma of a trial as is the perpetrator. The guilty
plea is quick and relatively anonymous. . . . The guilty plea, even if not preceded by a charge reduction,
offers the sentencing judge both a rationalization for showing leniency to deserving defendants and an
opportunity to do so in a setting ordinarily free from the publicity which attends trial.”).
23
See NEWMAN, supra note 17, at 95.
24
GROSS ET AL., supra note 19, at 12.
25
See id. (noting that only 19 of the 328 individuals exonerated initially pleaded guilty, or roughly
6% of all exonerations included in the database).
26
See Scott W. Howe, The Value of Plea Bargaining, 58 OKLA. L. REV. 599, 631 n.170 (2005)
(suggesting that guilty plea convictions may leave fewer avenues for later legal challenges to the
conviction, and that public sentiment that innocent individuals rarely plead guilty may make accessing
legal and investigatory assistance more difficult).
27
See generally Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969) (“A plea of guilty is more than a
confession which admits that the accused did various acts; it is itself a conviction; nothing remains but
to give judgment and determine punishment.”).
28
See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970). With the court’s consent, a defendant may
enter a plea of nolo contendere rather than plead guilty; however, courts treat such pleas as admissions
to all charges in the indictment. See Preliminary Proceedings: Guilty Pleas, supra note 9, at 403–04 &
n.1294. Therefore, the plea of nolo contendere has the same effect at sentencing as a guilty plea. See,
22
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trial-related constitutional rights, including the right to be tried by a jury of
his peers and the right to be confronted by the witnesses against him,29 a
plea is not valid unless the defendant waives these protections knowingly.30
Additionally, because the defendant has a Fifth Amendment right not to “be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,”31 the plea
must be entered into voluntarily and without threat of “physical harm” or
“mental coercion” in order to be valid.32 Although the requirement that a
plea be both voluntary and intelligent was already well-established, Boykin
v. Alabama added the requirement that the record of the proceeding
affirmatively disclose both items when the plea is entered.33 Reversalproofing pleas contributed to the Court’s interest in developing this record.34
When a defendant challenges the voluntariness of a plea, a court must
consider “all of the relevant circumstances surrounding [the plea],”35
including counsel’s representation.36 After pleading guilty based upon
advice from counsel, a defendant may only attack the voluntary and
intelligent nature of the plea by showing that the advice he received from
counsel violated the standard set forth in Strickland–Hill.37 A guilty plea
e.g., Gomez v. Berge, 434 F.3d 940, 942–43 (7th Cir. 2006); Preliminary Proceedings: Guilty Pleas,
supra note 9, at 404 n.1294. For purposes of this Comment, guilty pleas and nolo contendere will be
referred to collectively as “guilty pleas.”
29
U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”);
see also Brady, 397 U.S. at 748.
30
See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
31
Id.
32
Brady, 397 U.S. at 750. A guilty plea is not compelled, and therefore is valid, when it is
motivated by a defendant’s interest in receiving a specific or lesser sentence rather than facing a wider
range of possibilities at trial. Id. at 751.
33
395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969). Further, the Illinois Supreme Court adopted a rule that requires trial
judges to determine that a guilty plea is entered knowingly and voluntarily. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 402(a)–(b).
The judge must advise the defendant of the nature of the charges against him and the maximum and
minimum sentences that he may be subject to under the law. Id. at 401(a)(1)–(2). The defendant also
must be notified of his waiver of trial rights and the judge must determine, on the record, that the plea
was not obtained by “force or threats or any promises, apart from a plea agreement.” Id. at 402(b).
34
Boykin, 395 U.S. at 244 n.7 (“If these convictions are to be insulated from attack, the trial court is
best advised to conduct an on the record examination of the defendant which should include, inter alia,
an attempt to satisfy itself that the defendant understands the nature of the charges, his right to a jury
trial, the acts sufficient to constitute the offenses for which he is charged and the permissible range of
sentences.” (quoting Commonwealth ex rel. West v. Rundle, 237 A.2d 196, 197–98 (Pa. 1968)) (internal
quotation mark omitted)).
35
Brady, 397 U.S. at 749.
36
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985).
37
See id. at 57. Prior to Strickland, the applicable ineffectiveness standard was governed by
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970). The McMann test asked whether a guilty plea was “a
voluntary and intelligent act of the defendant.” Id. at 772. Strickland added an additional prejudice
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entered by a well-informed and appropriately counseled defendant is not
subject to postconviction attack because the applicable law changed or
because hindsight indicates that the plea entered was not as “sensible” as it
appeared to be at the time.38
Courts rely heavily on the defendant’s affirmative statements to
indicate that a plea was, in fact, voluntary. However, these statements
should not be viewed as conclusive, judgment-proof statements of a
defendant’s understanding of what she is giving up by pleading guilty.
“The plea bargain is the typical last act of the courthouse drama. Judges
engage defendants in monotone and sometimes mumbled plea colloquies.
Defendants bark ‘yes’ and ‘no,’ as required, and are instructed to consult
with their lawyers should they forget what line goes where.”39 Defendants
may fear that the consequences of not playing their role will negatively
impact the sentence that is ultimately assigned by the judge.40
If the court determines that a plea was not voluntary because the
defendant received ineffective assistance from counsel, the applicable
remedy depends upon when counsel’s errors occurred and when the
defendant raised his ineffective assistance claim.41 If performance was
ineffective only during the sentencing phase, the court may require a new
penalty phase without vacating the conviction or ordering an entirely new
trial.42 In many cases, the ineffective assistance claim is made in a
postconviction or habeas corpus petition,43 where the immediate remedy
requirement to the McMann test. For a discussion of the development of the Strickland test, see infra
Part II.A.
38
See Brady, 397 U.S. at 756–57 (“Often the decision to plead guilty is heavily influenced by the
defendant’s appraisal of the prosecution’s case against him and by the apparent likelihood of securing
leniency should a guilty plea be offered and accepted. Considerations like these frequently present
imponderable questions for which there are no certain answers; judgments may be made that in the light
of later events seem improvident, although they were perfectly sensible at the time.”).
39
Josh Bowers, Response, The Unusual Man in the Usual Place, 157 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA
260, 274 (2009), http://www.pennumbra.com/responses/05-2009/Bowers.pdf.
40
See id.
41
See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 675, 686–87 (1984) (considering only whether
the defendant’s sentence should be overturned and not whether the conviction should be vacated when
the defendant claimed he received ineffective assistance of counsel during a capital sentencing
proceeding).
42
Id.
43
Typically, claims of ineffective assistance are limited to collateral review and are not considered
on direct appeal. See Trials: Right to Counsel, supra note 14, at 527–28. Habeas review is permitted
after a defendant has exhausted all state remedies, including state postconviction proceedings. Id. at
528.
Claims of ineffective assistance may be related to professional qualifications; performance before
trial, during jury selection, during trial, and during sentencing; performance on appeal; and actions
related to jury instructions. Id. at 521–25; see also Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 378 (1986)
(“A layman will ordinarily be unable to recognize counsel’s errors and to evaluate counsel’s
professional performance . . .[and] consequently a criminal defendant will rarely know that he has not
been represented competently until after trial or appeal, usually when he consults another lawyer about
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sought may simply be an evidentiary hearing.44 After the hearing, the
reviewing court may vacate the defendant’s plea if it determines that the
petitioner’s claim has merit.45
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD FOR INEFFECTIVENESS OF COUNSEL
This Part discusses the development of the two-prong Strickland test
for analyzing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Section A lays out
the Strickland test, which establishes the floor on a defendant’s Sixth
Amendment right to effective counsel in the trial setting. Section B
discusses the Supreme Court’s application of the Strickland test to guilty
pleas in Hill.
A. Ineffective Assistance in the Trial Context
In McMann v. Richardson, the Supreme Court recognized that the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel is the right to “effective counsel.”46 The
Court did not establish, however, what qualified representation as effective.
Nor did the Court directly address a claim of actual ineffectiveness of
counsel until Strickland, fourteen years later.47
In Strickland, the Court established a two-prong test to determine when
counsel’s performance qualifies as ineffective, and as a result, is a violation
of a defendant’s right to counsel.48 Although the proceeding at issue in

his case. Indeed, an accused will often not realize that he has a meritorious ineffectiveness claim until
he begins collateral review proceedings . . . .”(citation omitted)).
44
See, e.g., People v. Hall, 841 N.E.2d 913, 924 (Ill. 2005) (determining that the defendant was
entitled to an evidentiary hearing because he made a substantial showing that he received ineffective
assistance of counsel).
45
See, e.g., id. at 924 (“Following the evidentiary hearing, defendant might be allowed to withdraw
his guilty plea . . . .”). Defendant Hall, who pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated kidnapping, filed
a postconviction petition claiming, among other issues, that his counsel was ineffective in
recommending that he enter a guilty plea. Id. at 916–17. The postconviction petition was dismissed
prior to an evidentiary hearing. Id. at 917. Upon finding that the defendant established both prongs of
an ineffective assistance claim, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the defendant was entitled to an
evidentiary hearing on his postconviction claim that his plea was involuntary. Id. at 924.
46
397 U.S. 759, 770–771 & 771 n.14 (1970) (stating that “the right to counsel is the right to the
effective assistance of counsel,” and that effective counsel consists of a “reasonably competent attorney”
whose advice is “within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases”). Gideon v.
Wainwright established the modern right to counsel and applied the Sixth Amendment to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment. 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (stating that the right to counsel is
“fundamental” in nature and “essential to fair trials”).
47
466 U.S. at 683. Prior to Strickland, the Court considered Sixth Amendment claims based on
actual or constructive denial of assistance of counsel and claims based on state interference with
counsel’s ability to provide a defendant with effective assistance. Id.
48
Id. at 694.
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Strickland was a capital sentencing hearing, the Court said that it was
“sufficiently like a trial in its adversarial format” to be evaluated as such.49
The Court’s determination that the purpose of the Sixth Amendment
guarantee of counsel was to ensure that a defendant received a fair trial
guided the development of the Strickland test.50 The Court defined a fair
trial as one “whose result is reliable.”51 Carefully, the Court noted that the
purpose of the Sixth Amendment is “not to improve the quality of legal
representation” but is “simply to ensure that criminal defendants receive a
fair trial.”52
To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance and show that a
conviction “resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders
the result unreliable,” a defendant must satisfy both prongs of the Strickland
test,53 though there are some circumstances under which prejudice may be
assumed and need not be established by the defendant.54
Under the first prong, the defendant must show that counsel’s
performance was deficient by falling “below an objective standard of
reasonableness.”55 The objective standard is to be based on “reasonableness
49

Id. at 686. In Strickland, the defendant pleaded guilty to three capital murders in addition to
kidnapping charges in a Florida trial court. Id. at 671–72. Prior to pleading, the defendant confessed to
two of the murders. Id. at 672. The defendant told his attorney that he did not have a significant
criminal record and that he was under extreme emotional stress at the time of the murders, but the
attorney decided not to present any mitigating evidence at the capital sentencing hearing. Id. at 672–73.
The trial judge found several aggravating circumstances and no significant mitigating factors. Id. at 675.
He sentenced the defendant to death on each count of murder and to prison terms for the other crimes.
Id.
Upon review, the attorney stated that his decision not to investigate the defendant’s background,
obtain a psychiatric evaluation, or present character witnesses was strategic and intended to prevent the
state from cross-examining the defendant or presenting its own psychiatric evidence. Id. at 673. After
granting certiorari and defining the two-prong test for ineffective assistance, the Supreme Court held
that the defendant failed to satisfy either prong of the test. Id. at 700. The Court stated that the
sentencing proceeding was not “fundamentally unfair” and reversed the court of appeals, concluding that
the district court properly denied habeas corpus. Id. at 700–01.
50
Id. at 686 (“In giving meaning to the requirement [of representation by counsel], however, we
must take its purpose—to ensure a fair trial—as the guide.”).
51
Id. at 687; see also TOMKOVICZ, supra note 14, at 167 (“The Strickland majority believed that the
‘reasonable probability’ standard strikes just the right balance between the accused’s interests in
effective assistance and a fair trial and the state’s interest in finality. Under that standard, a
constitutional violation is found when, but only when, the likelihood that a defendant did not enjoy the
substantive protection guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment is too high to be ignored.”).
52
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.
53
Id. at 687; see also United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 657–62 (1984). Generally, a court may
dispose of an ineffectiveness claim by evaluating either the prejudice prong or performance prong first.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.
54
Prejudice is assumed if there was a: (1) complete denial of counsel during a critical stage of trial,
(2) complete failure to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing, (3) situation in
which not even a fully competent attorney could provide effective assistance, or (4) situation in which
counsel actively represented conflicting interests. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659, 661 & n.28.
55
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.
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under prevailing professional norms.”56 Additionally, because judicial
scrutiny of counsel’s performance is intended to be “highly deferential,” the
defendant must overcome a presumption that counsel’s conduct may have
been a sound strategy decision when assessed from counsel’s perspective at
the time of trial.57 For example, in Strickland, at the sentencing hearing,
defendant’s counsel argued that extreme emotional distress was a mitigating
circumstance and relied on the defendant’s acceptance of responsibility for
his crimes rather than on alternative approaches.58 The Court found that
counsel’s decisions were strategy choices “well within the range of
professionally reasonable judgments.”59
The second prong of Strickland requires the defendant to affirmatively
show that he was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance.60
Compared to the theoretically objective first prong, the second prong is
more subjective and requires that a defendant convince the court “that there
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different.”61 In determining
whether prejudice exists, the court must consider the “totality of the
evidence before the judge or jury.”62
In Strickland, the Court described the relevant question as “whether
there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the
sentencer . . . would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and

56

Id. The Court found that “[m]ore specific guidelines [were] not appropriate” because the Sixth
Amendment relies on the “legal profession’s maintenance of standards sufficient to justify the law’s
presumption that counsel will fulfill the role in the adversary process that the Amendment envisions.”
Id.
57
Id. at 689.
58
For a discussion of the sentencing hearing, see supra note 49.
59
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 699.
60
Id. at 693. Prior to Strickland and Cronic, the Court had never required a convicted defendant to
establish actual prejudice on the outcome of the proceeding at issue to make a Sixth Amendment claim.
Vivian O. Berger, The Supreme Court and Defense Counsel: Old Roads, New Paths—A Dead End?,
86 COLUM. L. REV. 9, 89 (1986).
61
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; see also TOMKOVICZ, supra note 14, at 160 (“The defendant must
demonstrate more than just ‘some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding’ but does not
have to establish ‘that counsel’s deficient conduct more likely than not altered the outcome in the case’;
that is, he does not have to show a probability of harm greater than 50 percent. The requisite likelihood
of adverse effect falls between these two levels.” (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693)).
62
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695. The Court suggested that whether or not a particular error is
prejudicial depends in part on the relative strength of the record. See id. at 695–96. For example, in a
case where the record strongly supports the verdict, a particular error may have a trivial effect, but in
another case where the record only weakly supports the outcome of the proceedings, the same error
could be prejudicial. Id. For examples of egregious conduct found to be non-prejudicial, see Jeffrey L.
Kirchmeier, Drink, Drugs, and Drowsiness: The Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel
and the Strickland Prejudice Requirement, 75 NEB. L. REV. 425, 455–63 (1996) (describing cases where
the Strickland test was not satisfied despite the fact that attorneys were intoxicated, sleeping, mentally
ill, or abusing drugs while at trial).
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mitigating circumstances did not warrant death.”63 Subsequently, the Court
found that due to the overwhelming aggravating factors, no reasonable
probability existed that the presence of the omitted mitigating evidence
would have changed the sentence imposed on the defendant.64
Not all of the Justices agreed with the development of the Strickland
approach. Justice Marshall disagreed with the majority on nearly every
point of the Strickland decision. He pointed out that the only justification
given by the majority for the adoption of a highly deferential standard was
that a more receptive standard would encourage too many defendants to file
ineffective assistance claims.65 In relation to the first prong, he objected to
the “malleable” nature of the test because it told the lower courts and
defense attorneys “almost nothing” about what would constitute adequate
representation.66
Justice Marshall also opposed the prejudice requirement for two
reasons.67 He disagreed with the majority’s interpretation of the Sixth
Amendment, arguing that the Constitution requires “fundamentally fair
procedures,” including a fair trial and counsel who “vigorously” advocates
for the defendant’s interests.68 He did not believe that counsel’s
performance was irrelevant in instances where the correct result was
achieved at trial.69 Marshall suggested that due process is violated
whenever a defendant does not receive meaningful assistance of counsel in
an adversarial proceeding.70

63

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695.
Id. at 700.
65
Id. at 713 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“I have more confidence than the majority in the ability of
state and federal courts expeditiously to dispose of meritless arguments . . . .”); see also id. at 690 (“The
availability of intrusive post-trial inquiry into attorney performance or of detailed guidelines for its
evaluation would encourage the proliferation of ineffectiveness challenges. Criminal trials resolved
unfavorably to the defendant would increasingly come to be followed by a second trial, this one of
counsel’s unsuccessful defense.”).
66
Id. at 707–08 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 663
(1984) (rejecting the Tenth Circuit’s use of five factors to provide a basis for determining whether the
defendant was provided with competent counsel). Over time, criticism of the looseness of the Strickland
test has been somewhat abated as courts have increasingly “tightened” counsel’s duty to investigate by
looking to American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice as “an evaluative tool rather than
mere ‘guidelines’” to analyze defense counsel’s performance. Robert R. Rigg, The T-Rex Without
Teeth: Evolving Strickland v. Washington and The Test for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 35 PEPP.
L. REV 77, 104 (2007).
67
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 710 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
68
Id. at 711.
69
Id. (disagreeing with the majority and characterizing their viewpoint as standing for the principle
“that the only purpose of the constitutional guarantee of effective assistance of counsel is to reduce the
chance that innocent persons will be convicted” and that “the Sixth Amendment is not violated when a
manifestly guilty defendant is convicted after a trial in which he was represented by a manifestly
ineffective attorney”).
70
Id.
64
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Additionally, Justice Marshall thought it “senseless” to require a
defendant whose lawyer was shown to be incompetent to carry the burden
of demonstrating prejudice.71 He argued that “[t]he difficulties of
estimating prejudice after the fact are exacerbated by the possibility that
evidence of injury to the defendant may be missing from the record
precisely because of the incompetence of defense counsel.”72 He suggested
that the Strickland test should instead focus on whether counsel departed
from “constitutionally prescribed standards” rather than requiring
prejudice.73 In such cases, defendants would be entitled to a new trial
regardless of whether they “suffered demonstrable prejudice.”74
B. Extension of the Strickland Test to Guilty Pleas
About eighteen months after Strickland, the Supreme Court extended
the two-prong approach to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in the
guilty plea context.75 Prior to Hill, McMann provided the rule regarding the
voluntariness, and therefore the validity, of a guilty plea. That decision
required that attorney performance fall “within the range of competence
demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.”76 As in Strickland, the first prong
of the test remained materially the same and required that a convicted
defendant show that her attorney’s performance “fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness.”77 The Court reasoned that sentencing hearings
71

Id. at 710.
Id.; see also Berger, supra note 60, at 92 (“After-the-fact reconstruction of events and decisional
processes is not easy; it usually requires supplementing the trial transcript at a post-trial hearing or in
habeas proceedings.”).
73
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 712 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
74
Id.
75
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57 (1985) (“Although our decision in Strickland v. Washington
dealt with a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in a capital sentencing proceeding . . . our
justifications for imposing the ‘prejudice’ requirement . . . are also relevant in the context of guilty
pleas . . . .”).
In Hill, the defendant pleaded guilty to charges of first-degree murder and theft of property after his
attorney negotiated a guilty plea. Id. at 53–54. Under the plea agreement, the state agreed to
recommend concurrent sentences of thirty-five years for the murder and ten years for the theft. Id. at 54.
Later, the defendant alleged that his guilty plea was involuntary because his attorney provided
ineffective assistance of counsel by misinforming him of when he would be eligible for parole. Id. at
54–55. Because the defendant had a prior conviction, he was not eligible for parole until he served half
of his sentence, rather than the one-third that his attorney advised him of prior to entering his plea. Id.
In his petition for habeas corpus, the defendant did not allege that he would have gone to trial had his
attorney correctly advised him of the collateral consequences of his plea. Id. at 60. Additionally, the
defendant did not supply any “special circumstances that might support the conclusion that he placed
particular emphasis on his parole eligibility in deciding whether or not to plead guilty.” Id. The Court
affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of his habeas petition without a hearing. Id.
76
See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970).
77
See Hill, 474 U.S. at 57 (citing McMann, 397 U.S. at 687–88) (internal quotation mark omitted);
see also Gabriel J. Chin & Richard W. Holmes, Jr., Effective Assistance of Counsel and the
Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 697, 733 (2002) (“The Hill v. Lockhart decision,
72
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or trials were similar enough to the plea process to apply the same
standard.78
The Court also extended the application of the prejudice prong to the
context of guilty pleas, determining that it served “the fundamental interest
in the finality of guilty pleas.”79 The McMann prejudice requirement is
slightly different from its Strickland counterpart: it focuses on whether
“counsel’s constitutionally ineffective performance affected the outcome of
the plea process.”80 To satisfy the requirement, “the defendant must show
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would
not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.”81 The
Court suggested that in many cases, this analysis would look nearly
identical to the Strickland analysis and would hinge on whether counsel
would have still recommended the plea.82 In Hill, the Court held that the
defendant failed to allege the type of prejudice necessary to satisfy the
Strickland test because he did not allege that “he would have pleaded not
guilty and insisted on going to trial.”83
Although Justice White and Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment,
their agreement relied on a factual point: the defendant did not establish that
his attorney knew of his prior criminal record before determining when the
defendant would become eligible for parole.84 The distinction between the
majority opinion and Justice White’s concurrence, joined by Justice
Stevens, turned on whether the defendant expected a particular sentence
based on his counsel’s estimate or whether his counsel’s advice was a

however, contains no suggestion that counsel’s duty is less in the context of a plea. Earlier Supreme
Court decisions recognize that a defendant’s decision to plead guilty is based on at least some of the
same kind of evaluation and investigation that is necessary to go to trial.” (footnote omitted)).
78
Hill, 474 U.S. at 58.
79
Id.; see also United States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780, 784 (1979) (detailing this principle more
thoroughly and stating that “[e]very inroad on the concept of finality undermines confidence in the
integrity of our procedures; and, by increasing the volume of judicial work, inevitably delays and
impairs the orderly administration of justice. The impact is greatest when new grounds for setting aside
guilty pleas are approved because the vast majority of criminal convictions result from such pleas”
(quoting United States v. Smith, 440 F.2d 521, 528–29 (7th Cir. 1971) (Stevens, J., dissenting)) (internal
quotation mark omitted)).
80
Hill, 474 U.S. at 59.
81
Id.
82
Id. The Court pointed out that this analysis requires a court to predict how the outcome of the
proceeding might have changed if a trial was held. Id. As in Strickland, evaluations of the outcome of
this hypothetical trial are to be as objective as possible. Id. at 59–60.
83
Id. at 60; see also TOMKOVICZ, supra note 14, at 169 (“A defendant must demonstrate a
cognizable likelihood that he would have chosen to stand trial but apparently does not have to establish a
reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been different from the result of the guilty
plea.”). See infra Part IV.B for further discussion of this interpretation.
84
Hill, 474 U.S. at 61–62 (Stevens & White, JJ., concurring). The plea statement, signed by the
defendant, stated that he did not have any prior convictions; however, the defendant had one prior
conviction. Id. at 61.
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misstatement of the law.85 The majority viewed counsel’s advice as an
estimate because the negotiated plea agreement did not bind the trial court,
which had the freedom to sentence the defendant to another term if it saw
fit.86 Further, determinative parole eligibility was not included in the plea
agreement.87 The extension of the Strickland test to the plea setting creates
new challenges for defendants who must now satisfy the Strickland
prejudice requirements to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel.
III. DEVELOPMENT OF THE ILLINOIS STANDARD FOR INEFFECTIVENESS OF
COUNSEL
This Part examines Illinois’s adoption and development of the
Strickland–Hill88 standard in the guilty plea context. Section A focuses on
the origin of additional requirements incorporated into the Strickland–Hill
standard that are applied in Illinois. Section B details the Illinois standard
for ineffective assistance in the guilty plea context, which requires a
defendant to claim either innocence or a plausible defense that could be
raised at trial to satisfy the prejudice prong.
A. Development of the “Additional Pieces” of the Illinois Standard
Although Illinois courts adopted the standard for ineffective assistance
in the guilty plea context from Hill, they have also incorporated several
additional requirements that stem from the appellate courts. The first
additional piece is from the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Key v. United
States,89 in which the court evaluated a post-Hill claim of ineffective

85

Id. at 62 (“The failure of an attorney to inform his client of the relevant law . . . cannot be said to
fall within ‘the wide range of professionally competent assistance’ demanded by the Sixth Amendment.”
(quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690 (1984)).
86
Id. at 60 (“In the present case the claimed error of counsel is erroneous advice as to eligibility for
parole under the sentence agreed to in the plea bargain.”).
87
See Steve Clark & Alice Ann Byrns, Hill v. Lockhart: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: The
State’s Position, 23 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 83, 91 (1985) (“[A]dvice should not be held as rendering a plea
involuntary where the state court record presumptively establishes that the advice was not part of the
plea bargain and did not induce the plea. Likewise important, the recommended sentence was not
binding on the trial court; thus, the issue of parole eligibility amounts to no more than a sentence
estimate by counsel on which the defendant based his erroneous expectation and hope for leniency. The
State is aware of no precedent which indicates that all terms and conditions discussed in the plea
bargaining process, whether between defense counsel and his or her client or even with the state’s
attorney, can be held to have induced a plea of guilty.” (footnotes omitted)).
88
The ineffective assistance of counsel test applied in the guilty plea context is often referred to as
the Strickland test, the Hill test, or by some combination of both names. For the purposes of this
Comment, Strickland–Hill will be used to refer to the test that was initially developed in Strickland and
was later adjusted and extended to guilty pleas in Hill. For a discussion of the development of this test,
see supra Part II.
89
806 F.2d 133 (7th Cir. 1986).
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assistance of counsel.90 In Key, the convicted defendant attempted to meet
the prejudice prong required by Strickland–Hill by stating that but for his
attorney’s erroneous promise that “he would ‘be on the street in twelve
months,’” he would have gone to trial.91 At trial, he contended, a jury
would have been unable to convict him for “want of a corpus delecti
[sic].”92
In evaluating the prejudice prong, the court expressed concern over
what a defendant must show to establish his claim.93 The Seventh Circuit
determined “that merely making bare allegations of alleged promises is
insufficient to show actual prejudice” and that a defendant must supply the
court with facts which indicate “the result of the proceeding would have
been different.”94 “[M]erely alleg[ing] a promise by counsel,” as the
prisoner had in his habeas petition, failed to satisfy the standard laid out by
the court.95 The court suggested that evidence such as the terms of the
promise made by counsel, when and where the promise was made, and the
identities of any witnesses to the promise, which would allow the court to
“meaningfully assess” the defendant’s claim, would be sufficient to satisfy
the defendant’s evidentiary burden.96
Building on the requirements articulated in Key, the Seventh Circuit
clarified that a defendant’s claim that he would not have entered into a
particular plea agreement or sentence if he had been better advised by
counsel does not satisfy the prejudice requirement without more.97 It held
that prejudice is not established when a defendant “only suggests that he
90

See id. at 138. Key, along with six other defendants, was indicted on eleven tax-related charges.
Id. at 135. Partway through trial, Key agreed to enter a guilty plea pursuant to a negotiated plea
agreement. Id. He was sentenced to three years in prison and ordered to pay a $15,000 fine. Id.
Although he did not file a direct appeal, Key later filed a habeas petition claiming ineffective assistance
of counsel, among other collateral attacks on the guilty plea proceeding. Id. The court affirmed the
lower court’s dismissal of Key’s habeas petition without an evidentiary hearing. Id. at 140.
91
Id. at 138 n.5 (quoting Pet’r’s Br.).
92
Id. (internal quotation mark omitted). Corpus delicti is defined as “the body of the offense” or
“the substance of the crime” and is often used to describe visible evidence of a crime. BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 395 (9th ed. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
93
Key, 806 F.2d at 138–39 (discussing decisions reached in other appellate courts regarding the
“prejudice prong,” including the First Circuit, Fifth Circuit, Ninth Circuit, and Eleventh Circuit).
94
Id. at 139.
95
Id.
96
Id. The court cautioned that even these specific facts may not be enough to overcome the record
and warrant an evidentiary hearing. Id.
97
Gargano v. United States, 852 F.2d 886, 891 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding that although “the petitioner
admitted in a memorandum that a plea-bargain would be the most likely outcome were the case to return
to the active docket,” prejudice was not established). In Gargano, the defendant was under indictment
for ten charges related to cocaine distribution and weapons possession. Id. at 887. He pleaded guilty
and was sentenced to a term of fourteen years in prison pursuant to a negotiated agreement. Id. The
Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of defendant’s habeas petition, which was based on
a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 891. Defendant alleged that counsel was ineffective
for misstating the consequences of conviction under enhanced sentencing laws. Id. at 889.
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should have had the opportunity to strike a harder bargain with the
government”;98 the prejudice prong requires that the defendant would have
gone to trial—not simply struck a harder bargain—but for counsel’s
deficient performance.99
After Key added to the threshold evidentiary requirements necessary to
satisfy the prejudice prong of Strickland–Hill as applied in Illinois and the
rest of the Seventh Circuit, the First Circuit contributed a new requirement
later adopted by Illinois courts. In United States v. LaBonte,100 the First
Circuit heard a consolidated appeal primarily related to the interpretation of
a career offender sentencing statute but which also included a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel.101 The defendant alleged that his plea was
entered after his trial attorney “assured him that his sentence would be no
more than eighteen months, and that there was simply ‘no way’ that he
would be sentenced as a career offender.”102 He was sentenced to a 262month term of imprisonment.103
When applying the Strickland–Hill prejudice prong to the defendant’s
claim of ineffective assistance, the court stated that “[e]ven a generous
reading of this claim leaves no doubt that [the defendant] failed adequately
to allege any cognizable prejudice.”104 The court characterized counsel’s
statements to the defendant as an “inaccurate prediction,” and thus,
“standing alone, [do] not satisfy the prejudice prong of the ineffective
assistance test.”105 Most importantly, the court implied that the defendant
needed to raise “either a claim of innocence” or articulate “any plausible
defense that he could have raised had he opted for trial” to meet his burden
of proof on the second prong of Strickland–Hill.106 Because the defendant
could not establish that he suffered prejudice as a result of his attorney’s
performance, the court elected not to evaluate that performance under the
first prong.107

98

Id. at 891.
See id.
100
70 F.3d 1396 (1st Cir. 1995), overruled on other grounds by 520 U.S. 751 (1997).
101
Id. at 1400, 1412–13. In LaBonte, one of the defendants, Stephen Dyer, pleaded guilty to a
charge of conspiring to possess controlled substances with intent to distribute. Id. at 1403.
102
Id. at 1413.
103
Id. at 1403.
104
Id. at 1413.
105
Id.
106
Id.
107
Id. at 1414. Interestingly, the LaBonte court adopted this standard from dicta in a D.C. Circuit
Court case, United States v. Horne, 987 F.2d 833 (D.C. Cir. 1993). See 70 F.3d at 1413. In Horne, the
court discussed the difficulty in determining what the prejudice prong of the Strickland–Hill test
required of defendants. 987 F.2d at 835–36. The court elected to leave the question of “how much more
[than a bare allegation] is required of [the defendant]” unanswered because the defendant who raised the
ineffectiveness claim did not allege that he would have insisted on going to trial but for counsel’s errors,
and therefore altogether failed to address the prejudice prong of the test. Id. at 836 (“Nothing in the
99
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B. The Illinois Standard for Ineffective Assistance in the Context of Guilty
Pleas
Illinois has adopted the Strickland–Hill test for determining whether a
defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel when she entered a plea
of guilty.108 In addition to the traditional Strickland–Hill requirements, a
defendant must satisfy additional requirements that the Illinois Supreme
Court adopted from the appellate courts and incorporated into its
interpretation of Strickland–Hill109 to succeed on her claim.
In People v. Rissley,110 the Illinois Supreme Court discussed the
difficulty of determining the probability that a defendant would have gone
to trial. The court adopted the Key threshold that a bare statement is not
enough to establish prejudice.111 The court then adopted the LaBonte
requirement that a defendant must raise a claim of innocence or a plausible
defense that could have been raised at trial in order to satisfy the prejudice
prong.112 In evaluating the defendant’s claim that the “mistaken advice” he
received from counsel constituted ineffective assistance,113 the court first
acknowledged that the defendant’s attorney lacked experience in capital
cases.114 Second, the court noted that the attorney’s co-counsel and
consulting death penalty expert thought that recommending the entry of a
blind plea in a death-penalty-eligible case was ill-advised.115 Finally, the
court recognized that that counsel admitted he that he did not know or, at a

present record suggests that Horne had (or even now has) any intention of pleading not guilty and going
to trial.”).
108
Illinois first adopted the Strickland standard in People v. Albanese and then applied it to an
ineffective assistance claim in the guilty plea context in People v. Huante. See People v. Huante, 571
N.E.2d 736, 739 (Ill. 1991); People v. Albanese, 473 N.E.2d 1246, 1255–56 (Ill. 1984).
109
See supra Part II.A.
110
795 N.E.2d 174 (Ill. 2003). In Rissley, the defendant entered a blind plea to charges of
aggravated kidnapping and murder. Id. at 177. The plea was entered “without negotiation and without
defense counsel’s conducting an extensive investigation of potential mitigation.” Id. at 188. At his
capital sentencing hearing, he was sentenced to death on the murder charge and fifteen years in prison
on the aggravated kidnapping charge. Id. at 188, 207. The defendant raised several claims of
ineffective assistance among some fifty-six other claims in his postconviction petition. Id. at 178.
The defendant alleged that his attorney, along with his co-counsel and a death penalty expert
retained in the case, recommended he enter blind pleas to both charges because it would prevent him
from getting the death penalty. Id. at 195. Finally, the defendant alleged that his attorney did not inform
him that his case could be heard by a judge in a bench trial rather than a jury. Id. Note that while the
defendant raised multiple ineffective assistance claims, only the most pertinent claim is discussed here.
111
Id. at 204. For a more detailed discussion of Key, see supra Part III.A.
112
Rissley, 795 N.E.2d at 205. For a more detailed discussion of LaBonte, see supra Part III.A.
113
Rissley, 795 N.E.2d at 203.
114
Id. at 196. In fact, co-counsel on the case immediately prepared and filed a motion to withdraw
defendant’s plea and believed that the counsel’s sworn affidavit and the death penalty expert’s testimony
would be enough to withdraw the plea. Id. at 196–97.
115
Id. at 197 (“[T]he death penalty expert] advised [counsel] that the guilty plea was ill-advised
because by pleading guilty defendant had nothing left to bargain with . . . .”).
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minimum, did not discuss the possibility of a bench trial for the case-inchief.116 Primarily based on counsel’s failure to realize that the defendant
could proceed with a bench trial, the court “assume[d]” that counsel was
deficient for purposes of the appeal.117
In turning to the second prong of the Strickland–Hill test, the court
focused on the fact that the defendant “[did] not now allege that he [was]
innocent, nor [did] he claim to have any plausible defense that he could
have raised had he chosen a bench trial.”118 The court relied on defendant’s
admissions during the plea proceedings to draw these conclusions.119
Despite counsel’s deficient performance, the court concluded that the
defendant entered his plea to “gain leniency from the sentencing jury” and
that the court’s “confidence in the outcome [was] not ‘undermined.’”120
Because the defendant failed to make anything more than a bare allegation,
the Rissley court did not have to determine when the prejudice prong would
be satisfied. It nevertheless adopted the innocence or defense requirement
from LaBonte.121
IV. THE ILLINOIS APPLICATION OF THE PREJUDICE PRONG OF STRICKLAND–
HILL IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
The Illinois application of the Strickland–Hill prejudice prong is
unconstitutional because it only addresses the effectiveness of counsel
provided to a defendant in the guilty plea context if that defendant can raise
a claim of innocence or a defense to the charges against him. In this Part,
section A examines the difficult threshold and heightened subjectivity of
this standard. Then, section B considers whether the Supreme Court has
communicated that actual innocence is not part of the ineffectiveness
calculation.
A. A Steep and Subjective Barrier
The Supreme Court left it to the states and appellate courts to
determine what would be sufficient to satisfy the subjective prejudice

116

Id. at 198 (“No, I didn’t think of it, I didn’t discuss it, I didn’t discuss it.” (internal quotation
mark omitted)).
117
Id. at 204.
118
Id. at 205. It appears that the defendant simply entered a “bare allegation” that was described by
the court as “subjective, self-serving, and . . . insufficient to satisfy the Strickland requirement for
prejudice.” Id. (quoting Turner v. Tennessee, 858 F.2d 1201, 1206 (6th Cir. 1988) (internal quotation
marks omitted), vacated on other grounds, 492 U.S. 902).
119
Id. For a discussion of the admissions that a defendant is required to make on the record in order
to enter a guilty plea, see supra notes 27–28 and accompanying text.
120
Rissley, 795 N.E.2d at 206. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the defendant’s conviction and
sentence. Id. at 207.
121
Id. at 205.
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requirement of the Strickland–Hill prejudice prong.122 Illinois has focused
the prejudice prong on requiring that a defendant show that he could be
found innocent or acquitted at trial.123 This standard has two fundamental
flaws: first, this burden is nearly insurmountable for defendants in the guilty
plea context. Second, the right to counsel has never been conditioned upon
guilt or innocence.
The record in a plea hearing consists mostly of the defendant entering
her plea,124 and leaves little else for a court to evaluate on appeal beyond
any available affidavits from the defendant and counsel.125 This leaves
defendants with little ammunition to meet a heavy burden of proof; in many
cases, courts simply weigh the defendant’s accusations of ineffective
assistance against his attorney’s rebuttal.126
For example, when applying the Illinois prejudice standard in People v.
Hall,127 the court considered the plea hearing transcript, a copy of the
charging instrument, and the defendant’s affidavit in support of his claim
that he was misadvised about the possibility of a defense to the charge of
122

See, e.g., Key v. United States, 806 F.2d 133, 138 (7th Cir. 1986) (expressing concern over how
to interpret the defendant’s burden under the prejudice prong); Rissley, 795 N.E.2d at 204 (“[I]t is by no
means obvious how a court is to determine the probability that a defendant would have gone to trial.”).
123
See the discussion of Rissley, supra Part III.B, where the court determined that the defendant did
not achieve the requisite prejudice after the performance prong was satisfied because the court focused
on the defendant’s lack of a credible claim of innocence or defense.
124
See supra notes 33–34 and accompanying text (discussing admissions that are required to be on
the record when a defendant’s plea is entered); see also Preliminary Proceedings: Guilty Pleas, supra
note 9, at 414 (“[T]he court reporter must keep a verbatim record of the plea proceedings that take place
in court, including the court’s advice to the defendant, the voluntariness inquiry, the factual basis
inquiry, and the details of the plea agreement.”).
125
See Richard Klein, The Relationship of the Court and Defense Counsel: The Impact on
Competent Representation and Proposals for Reform, 29 B.C. L. REV. 531, 551–52 (1988) (“Given the
sparseness of the record when a plea is taken, proving prejudice to courts that desire finality will be most
difficult. . . . It is, however, virtually impossible for a state appeals court, relying on the plea record, to
evaluate ‘likely success.’” (footnote omitted)); see also Berger, supra note 60, at 110 (“As Judge
Cudahy of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit correctly noted, assessing prejudice in terms of a
putative outcome at trial is ‘unworkable . . . because the reviewing court has no trial record to review
and consequently no way of evaluating the effect of counsel’s errors in relation to the case as actually
presented by the prosecution.’” (quoting Evans v. Meyer, 742 F.2d 371, 380 (7th Cir. 1984) (Cudahy, J.,
dissenting))).
126
Reviewing a sparse, “cold” record presents additional challenges for appellate courts that must
distinguish opinion from promise, misstatement from misrepresentation, and strategy decision from
neglect. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 710 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“On the
basis of a cold record, it may be impossible for a reviewing court confidently to ascertain how the
government’s evidence and arguments would have stood up against rebuttal and cross-examination by a
shrewd, well-prepared lawyer.”).
127
841 N.E.2d 913 (Ill. 2005). The defendant filed a postconviction petition, seeking withdrawal of
his guilty plea and claiming that the plea was involuntary because he received ineffective assistance of
counsel. Id. at 915. The defendant entered a negotiated plea to aggravated kidnapping based on his
attorney’s advice that he did not have a valid defense to the charges. Id. at 916–17. He received a
recommended sentence of six years in prison. Id. at 916.
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aggravated kidnapping, inducing him to enter his plea.128 In Hall, the
defendant was charged with aggravated kidnapping, theft of property, and
aggravated and unlawful refusal of an order to stop after he stole a car that
had an infant sleeping in a car seat inside of it.129 The court read the
elements of aggravated kidnapping aloud at the time the plea was entered,
which included knowledge of the child’s presence.130 The trial and
appellate courts determined that because the defendant was informed that
the prosecution would be required to establish the element of knowledge to
convict him of aggravated kidnapping before the defendant entered his plea,
erroneous advice provided by defendant’s trial counsel did not prejudice the
defendant.131 As a result, the trial and appellate courts held the defendant’s
claim of prejudice insufficient.132
On review, the Illinois Supreme Court explained that “[t]hese
allegations indicate counsel’s legal advice was rendered within the bounds
of a private consultation between defendant and his attorney” and pointed
out that the discussions surrounding a defendant’s decision whether to enter
a guilty plea or go to trial “generally occur in private to protect the
confidentiality of privileged information.”133 The information available to
the court in this case was comparable to that which was available in
Rissley.134
Although the court in each case determined that the defendant
established the first prong of the Strickland–Hill test,135 the results diverged
during the prejudice prong analysis. As discussed above, the Rissley court
determined that the defendant did not make a sufficient showing that the
result at trial would be different.136 In making this determination, the court
128

Id. at 916–17. The defendant alleged that he only intended to steal the car because he needed a
ride home and that he repeatedly told his lawyer that he did not realize there was an infant sleeping in
the car when he took it. Id. at 917. Despite the fact that “knowledge” is an element of aggravated
kidnapping, id. at 918, the defendant’s lawyer “repeatedly informed defendant that his lack of awareness
of the child was not a defense to the charge,” id. at 917.
129
Id. at 916–17.
130
Id. at 918.
131
Id.
132
Id.
133
Id. at 919 (“Given these circumstances, the only affidavit defendant could have furnished to
support his allegations, other than his own, was that of his attorney. . . . [T]he ‘difficulty or
impossibility of obtaining such an affidavit is self-apparent.’” (quoting People v. Williams, 264 N.E.2d
697, 698 (Ill. 1970))).
134
The defendant filed an affidavit in support of his habeas petition which detailed discussions he
had with counsel and co-counsel. People v. Rissley, 795 N.E.2d 174, 195 (Ill. 2003). The court also
examined the transcript of the plea proceedings. See id. at 186–88. Additionally, the attorney’s cocounsel and a death penalty expert testified at a hearing in support of counsel’s ineffective assistance.
Id. at 196–98.
135
Hall, 841 N.E.2d at 920 (“[D]efendant’s petition establishes a substantial showing that his
attorney’s advice was objectively unreasonable.”).
136
Rissley, 795 N.E.2d at 205.
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attacked the defendant’s credibility, finding it difficult to believe that
counsel’s deficient performance induced his plea.137 In support of its
decision, the court raised the fact that the defendant made admissions on the
record during the plea hearing and stated that defendant’s motivation was
“leniency from the sentencing jury.”138
Few reasonable explanations exist for entering a blind guilty plea in a
death-penalty-eligible case, so it is surprising that the court did not believe
that counsel’s deficient advice regarding the undesirability of the jury
hearing the case twice139 affected the defendant’s decision. Additionally,
based on the particular facts of the case, going to trial despite a probable
finding of guilt was preferable to pleading guilty because the plea
eliminated some of the defendant’s claims, such as a jurisdictional claim
that co-counsel and the death penalty expert thought had promise on
appeal.140 By entering a blind plea, the defendant guaranteed that he would
be found guilty while leaving open the possibility that he would be
sentenced to death.141
On the other hand, in Hall, the court concluded with little discussion
both that the prejudice prong was satisfied and that there was a reasonable
probability that defendant would have proceeded to trial absent counsel’s
deficient advice.142 The court held this despite the state’s claim that it
“strain[ed] belief” to argue that the defendant did not know the child was in
the car.143 The court did not think that the trial court’s admonishments
“negate[d] the effect of [the] erroneous advice from defense counsel”;144
137

Id. at 206.
Id. For a discussion of the requirement that a defendant make admissions on the record when a
guilty plea is entered, see supra notes 27–28 and accompanying text.
139
The defendant contended that he was told by his attorney that he would not get the death penalty
if he waived the jury trial. Rissley, 795 N.E.2d at 195. His counsel corroborated these allegations in
stating that he did not inform the defendant that he was entitled to a bench trial rather than a jury trial.
Id. at 198. His attorney testified that he told the defendant that “it would be better that [the jurors] don’t
hear all this twice, it’s better they hear it once.” Id.
140
Defendant’s counsel was aware that the state was seeking the death penalty, but as indicated by
the term “blind plea,” he had no assurances as to what sentence the defendant would receive during
sentencing. Id. at 185 (“[T]he prosecutor advised both defendant and the circuit court of the State’s
intention to seek the death penalty in the case.”). A death penalty expert told counsel that “the [blind]
guilty plea was ill-advised because by pleading guilty defendant had nothing left to bargain with and that
the plea waived arguments such as jurisdiction.” Id. at 197.
141
Although the defendant was sentenced to death, his sentence was later commuted to natural life
by then-Governor George Ryan. Id. at 177. In fact, after the commutation, the defendant entered a
motion to dismiss his postconviction petition. Id. The court denied his motion, resulting in this opinion.
Id.
142
People v. Hall, 841 N.E.2d 913, 921 (Ill. 2005).
143
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the court described credibility arguments as
“misplaced” because such judgments are not made at the second stage of postconviction proceedings.
Id.
144
Id.; see also id. at 923 (“The admonition ensured defendant was aware of the language of the
charge, but it did not add to his understanding of the knowledge element of the offense.”).
138
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rather, it took the repetitive nature of the erroneous advice into
consideration.145
It is difficult to distinguish the facts of Rissley from those of Hall.
However, one distinguishing factor between the two cases is that at the plea
hearing in Hall, the defendant entered a guilty plea but did not admit that he
was guilty of the offense.146 Additionally, the defendant received the
negotiated sentence of six years.147
In Rissley and Hall, the proceedings focused primarily on whether the
defendant could establish a viable innocence claim or defense rather than on
counsel’s performance or attempts to ensure that proceedings were
fundamentally fair.148 The defendants received substandard advice from
counsel and argued that they would have made different decisions had their
attorneys performed adequately.149 However, in the capital case, such
allegations were not enough to meet the bar set by the state’s adaptation of
the prejudice prong.150 Providing defendants with a fundamentally fair
process was one of the Supreme Court’s underlying goals when it
developed the Strickland test.151
Innocence is not explicitly required by Strickland–Hill or the Sixth
Amendment.
Only allowing a defendant to challenge counsel’s
performance if he can also assert a claim of innocence is unfair152 and
highly subjective.
For these reasons, the Illinois standard is
unconstitutional.153
145

Id. at 923–24.
Id. at 916.
147
Id.
148
See id. at 921 (concluding that the defendant’s allegations supported a claim of innocence of
aggravated kidnapping); People v. Rissley, 795 N.E.2d 174, 205 (Ill. 2003) (discussing the defendant’s
admission of guilt and lack of a plausible defense in finding that the defendant was not prejudiced by
counsel’s performance).
149
See Rissley, 795 N.E.2d at 195; Hall, 841 N.E.2d at 917.
150
Rissley, 795 N.E.2d at 205.
151
For a discussion of the Court’s interests in developing the Strickland v. Washington test, see
supra Part II.A.
152
See Klein, supra note 125, at 552 (“The requirement that in order for a defendant to obtain relief
from a plea in which he was not afforded the effective assistance of counsel he must show that he would
have gone to trial and perhaps have been acquitted, overlooks the many serious ways a defendant suffers
from inadequate counsel.”).
153
In Hill, when the Supreme Court adopted the Strickland prejudice requirement it acknowledged
that under some circumstances, such as when the “alleged error of counsel is a failure to investigate or
discover potentially exculpatory evidence,” it may be appropriate to consider whether such investigation
would have changed the outcome of the trial. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). However, the
Court declined to determine what was required to satisfy the prejudice prong when counsel was
ineffective for other conduct, such as providing erroneous advice, beyond whether “there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.” Id. at 57, 60 (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970) (internal quotation mark
omitted). In the case of erroneous advice, some courts require only that a defendant show that he would
have proceeded to trial rather than pleaded guilty. Illinois courts have interpreted the “outcome” at issue
146
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B. Indications that Innocence Is Not Required
Although not addressing the issue directly, the Supreme Court’s
decision in Kimmelman v. Morrison154 provides some insight into the
prejudice prong of Strickland.155 The majority stated that the Court had
“never intimated that the right to counsel is conditioned upon actual
innocence” because “[t]he constitutional rights of criminal defendants are
granted to the innocent and the guilty alike.”156
The Court further explained that the guarantee of effective assistance
does not belong “solely to the innocent” or apply only when proceedings
relate to the determination of guilt or innocence.157 On remand, the framing
of the issue implied that the defendant could establish the prejudice prong if
she showed that her Fourth Amendment claim had merit and “that if the
evidence had been excluded, there was a reasonable probability that the
outcome of the trial would have been different.”158 Justice Powell and
Justice Rehnquist concurred in the opinion and raised the objection that, if
the reviewing court determined that the evidence prejudiced the defendant,
it would render the “verdict[] less fair.”159

to be whether the defendant would have been acquitted at trial, rather than whether the defendant would
have pleaded guilty or gone to trial in situations where the defendant pleaded on the basis of counsel’s
erroneous advice. See Rissley, 795 N.E.2d at 204–05 (upholding the defendant’s blind plea entered
upon erroneous advice from counsel that the defendant would not receive the death penalty if he pleaded
guilty; the defendant received the death penalty).
154
477 U.S. 365 (1986). In Kimmelman, an attorney failed to make a crucial motion to exclude
from evidence during the defendant’s bench trial a bed sheet that was obtained during an illegal search.
Id. at 368–69. Counsel claimed that he was unaware of the seizure; however, one month before trial, the
prosecutor gave the defense a copy of a lab report detailing the stains and hairs found on the sheets. Id.
at 369. The evidence was entered at trial and the defendant was subsequently convicted of rape. Id. at
370–71. The defendant filed an unsuccessful direct appeal and an unsuccessful postconviction petition.
Id. at 371.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the defendant’s habeas claim. Id. at 373. The
primary issue on review was whether restrictions on the review of Fourth Amendment claims in habeas
petitions should be extended to Sixth Amendment claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 368.
155
Although this case relates to ineffective assistance of counsel in the trial context rather than the
guilty plea context, the similarity between the Strickland test and Strickland–Hill test suggests that the
Court’s view of whether or not innocence is required to satisfy the prejudice prong would apply in both
contexts.
156
Id. at 380.
157
Id.
158
TOMKOVICZ, supra note 14, at 163; see also Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 389 (“The question before
the federal courts is whether a reasonable probability exists that the trial judge would have had a
reasonable doubt concerning respondent’s guilt if the sheet and related testimony had been excluded.”).
159
Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 396 (Powell & Rehnquist, JJ., concurring). In some ways, this portion
of the concurrence illustrates a split in opinion over the function of the Sixth Amendment guarantee to
effective assistance. Like the Strickland majority, Justice Powell and Justice Rehnquist seemed to view
the purpose of Strickland and its progeny as ensuring that verdicts are rendered fairly. Id. at 396
(“Indeed, it has long been clear that exclusion of illegally seized but wholly reliable evidence renders
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Illinois should focus its application of the Strickland–Hill prejudice
prong on the “fundamental fairness” of the proceedings and discard the
unconstitutional actual innocence requirement. This change would center
on whether a defendant received effective counsel rather than whether he
would likely succeed at trial.
One way to create a constitutional standard is to relate the evidentiary
burden of the prejudice requirement to the type of ineffectiveness at issue.
In some instances, such as those in which a defendant claims that counsel’s
failure to investigate was prejudicial, it may be reasonable to consider the
probable effect of that evidence at trial. However, when counsel’s
ineffective performance is manifested through inaccurate statements of the
law or potential consequences facing a defendant, a determination of
whether the information induced the defendant’s plea seems more
appropriate. This determination is especially appropriate since a defendant
must be adequately informed in order to make a voluntary and intelligent
decision to plead guilty.160
V. RECONSIDERING THE APPLICATION OF STRICKLAND–HILL TO GUILTY
PLEAS
From its inception, the Strickland–Hill standard has been difficult to
administer in the context of guilty pleas. Commentators,161 the lower
appellate courts,162 and state courts163 have struggled to define precisely
what a defendant must establish in order to satisfy the prejudice prong of
the test. It is worth considering whether the Strickland–Hill test could be
improved, or if adopting an entirely new standard designed with the
verdicts less fair and just, because it ‘deflects the truthfinding process and often frees the guilty.’”
(quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 490 (1976))).
On the other hand, Justice Marshall thought that the Court’s focus was misplaced in Strickland and
that grossly incompetent assistance on its own violated the Sixth Amendment because of the procedural
unfairness that defendants with inept counsel suffer. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 707,
711 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall disagreed with the Strickland majority’s analysis
and with its adoption and formulation of the prejudice element. See id.; Klein, supra note 125, at 550
(“The primary objective of our criminal justice system must be justice, not finality and judicial
economy. It does not seem appropriate to tell the defendant who received incorrect information from an
attorney . . . that he has no recourse because ‘of the fundamental interest in the finality of guilty pleas.’”
(quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985))). Klein also notes that twenty years earlier, the Court
emphasized the rights of the individual over a need for finality, stating that “conventional notions of
finality . . . cannot be permitted to defeat . . . constitutional rights of personal liberty.” Id. at 550 n.136
(quoting Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 424 (1963)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
160
For further discussion of alternative approaches, see infra Part V.B.
161
See, e.g., TOMKOVICZ, supra note 14, at 160–61 (discussing an interpretation of the Strickland–
Hill prejudice prong that does not require the defendant to establish innocence).
162
For a discussion of the application of the Strickland–Hill prejudice prong by appellate courts, see
supra note 93.
163
See, e.g., supra Part IV.A for a discussion of the application of the Strickland–Hill prejudice
prong by Illinois courts.

1731

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

realities of the plea process in mind would benefit both defendants and the
courts. Section A of this Part will consider some reasons for change,
section B will propose alternative standards, and section C will discuss
concerns with changing the Strickland–Hill standard.
A. System-Legitimacy Concerns
The public’s perception of procedural justice—whether the criminal
justice system treats defendants fairly and respectfully regardless of the
substantive outcome reached—determines the public’s willingness to
engage in and comply with the system.164 The guilty plea process presents
competing concerns relating to the legitimacy of the system. First, finality
of guilty pleas is essential to maintaining confidence in the integrity of the
procedure.165 Additionally, finality ensures that the judicial workload is not
unnecessarily increased and that the “orderly administration of justice” is
not unduly delayed.166 The destabilization of guilty pleas presents a special
concern because of the sheer volume of criminal convictions that results
from pleas.167 With these considerations in mind, it is understandable that
courts are concerned with protecting convictions obtained through guilty
pleas against challenges from defendants who simply want “the opportunity
to strike a harder bargain with the government.”168 The Hill Court explicitly
discussed these concerns when it adopted the Strickland prejudice prong for
application in the guilty plea context.169
However, if the prejudice standard is set at a level at which it is
difficult for even those defendants with valid claims to meet the evidentiary
burden, then all guilty pleas, including those that result from prejudicial and
ineffective counsel, will be insulated from challenge.170 One particular
system-legitimacy concern in the guilty plea context is how ineffective
assistance affects disparate groups. Indigent defendants account for more

164

See generally E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL
JUSTICE 76–81 (1988) (analyzing studies on procedural justice and discussing how procedural justice
affects compliance with laws).
165
See United States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780, 784 (1979).
166
Id. (quoting United States v. Smith, 440 F.2d 521, 528–29 (7th Cir. 1971) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)).
167
See supra Part I.A for a discussion of the prevalence of guilty pleas.
168
Gargano v. United States, 852 F.2d 886, 891 (7th Cir. 1988).
169
See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985) (“[R]equiring a showing of ‘prejudice’ from
defendants who seek to challenge the validity of their guilty pleas on the ground of ineffective assistance
of counsel will serve the fundamental interest in the finality of guilty pleas . . . .”).
170
See, e.g., Martin C. Calhoun, Note, How to Thread the Needle: Toward a Checklist-Based
Standard for Evaluating Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 77 GEO. L.J. 413, 414, app. at 1
(1988) (noting that from the time of the Strickland decision until the time of the Note, (1) the Supreme
Court rejected all of the ineffectiveness claims that it squarely addressed and (2) that a survey of circuit
court ineffectiveness cases showed that only 30 of 702 claims, or 4.27%, were successful).
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than 80% of the individuals who are criminally prosecuted in state courts.171
Approximately 90% of indigent defendants plead guilty,172 making them
disproportionately more likely to suffer injustice as a result of the plea
process. These defendants are typically represented by public defenders
who practice under crushing caseloads and scarce resources.173 As a result,
in many cases defendants plead guilty before having had meaningful
contact with a public defender.174 Worse still, some public defenders are
“ill-informed about their clients’ cases and circumstances before advising
them to take pleas offered by prosecutors at arraignment.”175 By making
pleas difficult to challenge, the current prejudice standard perpetuates this
system. If a change in the applicable standard opened an avenue for
postconviction relief, the standard of representation at the trial level would
presumably improve.176 The current standard has been “universally
criticized as far less demanding than the ethical and professional standards
governing defense attorneys.”177
Further, when a procedure is perceived by the public as operating fairly
and with “procedural regularity,” it functions as a “psychological stabilizer”
and promotes the acceptance of the process.178 Through the adoption of the
171

See CAROLINE WOLFE HARLOW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS
SPECIAL REPORT: DEFENSE COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES 1 (2000), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.
gov/content/pub/pdf/dccc.pdf.
172
See Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, a National
Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1034 (2006).
173
See, e.g., Eric H. Holder, U.S. Attorney Gen., Address at the 2009 ABA Convention (Aug. 3,
2009) (transcript available at http://www.justice.gov/ag/speeches/2009/ag-speech-090803.html).
Resources for public defender programs lag far behind other justice system programs, constituting only
about 3% of all criminal justice expenditures in our nation’s largest counties. In many cases, contract
attorneys and assigned lawyers receive compensation that does not even cover their overhead.
Defenders in many jurisdictions carry huge caseloads that make it difficult for them to fulfill their legal
and ethical responsibilities to their clients. And we often hear of lawyers who cannot interview their
clients properly, file appropriate motions, conduct fact investigations, or perform many of the duties an
attorney ought to perform as a matter of course. See THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, JUSTICE DENIED:
AMERICA’S CONTINUING NEGLECT OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL 8 (2009), available at
http://www.nlada.org/DMS/Documents/1239831988.5/Justice%20Denied_%20Right%20to%20Counsel
%20Report.pdf.
174
See, e.g., Holder, supra note 173.
175
See Backus & Marcus, supra note 172, at 1033–34.
176
An increased number of successful ineffective assistance claims through postconviction and
habeas proceedings would create a trickle-down effect that would result in higher quality representation.
When faced with a number of reversals on ineffective-assistance grounds, trial courts would begin to
demand more of attorneys. In the same vein, an increased number of reversals may result in systematic
change like increased budgets for public defenders so they can reduce their individual case loads and
thoroughly prepare more cases.
177
See Backus & Marcus, supra note 172, at 1087.
178
See NEWMAN, supra note 17, at 44 n.45 (“It has not escaped those who have been concerned
with the institution of procedural regularity that one of its prime contributions is as a psychological
stabilizer; acceptance of law is substantially furthered to the extent that those subject to its rule observe
its workings with consistent, scrupulous fairness.” (quoting Sanford H. Kadish, The Advocate and the
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Federal Sentencing Guidelines and similar provisions by the states, the
penal system in the United States has moved away from focusing on
rehabilitation,179 yet it is arguably still a goal of the penal system. That goal
is furthered when a criminal defendant feels that she has been dealt with
fairly by the judicial system.180
B. Alternative Approaches
The approaches to altering the Strickland–Hill prejudice prong fall into
two primary categories: (1) adapting the application of the existing test to
provide more protection to defendants, or (2) designing a new standard
aligned with the realities of the plea bargaining process.181
In the first category, Professor Vivian Berger raised a question as to
how “Strickland’s outcome-prejudice test would apply to claims of
inadequate assistance rendered in connection with guilty pleas” shortly
before the Hill decision.182 Professor Berger suggested that the operative
language in Strickland indicated that a court must assess the effect of an
attorney’s deficient performance on the proceeding actually at issue.183
Under this approach, prejudice is equated with causation: if a defendant can
show that his attorney’s behavior played a substantial role in inducing the
plea, he has established prejudice.184 This standard does not attempt to
predict the outcome of a hypothetical trial, but rather focuses on whether
Expert—Counsel in the Peno-Correctional Process, 45 MINN. L. REV. 803, 836 (1961)) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
179
See, e.g., Frank O. Bowman, III, The Failure of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Structural
Analysis, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1315, 1318 (2005) (stating that after the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
were adopted, “[r]eformers doubted that rehabilitation worked, were skeptical of both the expertise and
fairness of parole boards, and rebelled against the seeming arbitrariness of standardless judicial
sentencing discretion”).
180
See NEWMAN, supra note 17, at 45 n.47 (“Certainly no circumstance could further that purpose
[rehabilitation] to a great[er] extent tha[t] a firm belief on the part of such offenders in the impartial,
unhurried, objective, and thorough process of the machinery of the law.” (quoting Fleming v. Tate, 156
F.2d 848, 850 (D.C. Cir. 1946)) (first alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
181
A third possibility, that the Supreme Court is trending toward relaxing the prejudice prong, has
also been suggested. See Whitney Cawley, Note, Raising the Bar: How Rompilla v. Beard Represents
the Court’s Increasing Efforts to Impose Stricter Standards for Defense Lawyering in Capital Cases, 34
PEPP. L. REV. 1139, 1176–81 (2007). Cawley suggests that a recent trio of capital cases where counsel
was found ineffective during the sentencing phase demonstrates this trend. See id. (citing Rompilla v.
Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362
(2000)). In each case, counsel was found ineffective because “an overwhelming amount of evidence as
to the defendant’s background and mental state was not presented to the jury.” Id. at 1181.
182
Berger, supra note 60, at 109.
183
Id. at 110 (highlighting that only the sentencing proceeding was considered by the court in
Strickland, rather than the likely results of a “hypothetical trial on guilt”).
184
Id. at 111. This Comment suggests that the Supreme Court clarifies and restates this standard,
which presents some line-drawing problems. However, even if the Court believes it prudent to maintain
some semblance of the Strickland–Hill formulation, such a test would still be a significant improvement
over the test currently applied in Illinois.
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counsel’s bad advice or poor performance induced a defendant’s guilty
plea. After applying this standard to Rissley and Hall, it is apparent that
both defendants, rather than just Hall, would have met this burden.185
Rissley entered his plea under the impression that he either had to have a
jury trial, which was disadvantageous due to the nature of the charges he
was facing, or enter a plea of guilty.186 In addition to this incorrect advice,
his attorney assured him that pleading guilty would prevent a death
sentence; however, this advice was false, as there was no agreement from
the prosecution to take the death penalty off the table.
This standard, if implemented, would allow more defendants to
succeed on their ineffective assistance claims. Adopting this standard
would not open the floodgates to all defendants who enter a plea and are
unhappy with the results—defendants would still need to demonstrate that
counsel provided inadequate assistance in addition to establishing
prejudice.187
A similar approach would be to allow defendants to establish a prima
facie case of ineffective assistance by establishing the first prong of the
Strickland–Hill test, at which point the prosecution would have the
responsibility of demonstrating that counsel’s performance did not
prejudice the defendant.188 As a threshold requirement, the defendant would
be required to demonstrate that her counsel’s performance fell below an
objective level of reasonableness. This requirement would serve as a
screening function for meritless claims. This approach is beneficial because
the prosecution is better situated to rebut the claim of prejudice than a
defendant.
C. Objections to Changing the Strickland–Hill Standard
The Strickland–Hill test is intended to balance competing interests of
accuracy and stability with a fair process in which counsel engages in an
adversarial process “as the guilty defendant’s advocate.”189 When the idea
185
186

See supra Part IV.A for further discussion of Hall and Rissley.
See supra notes 139–41 for further discussion of the circumstances surrounding Rissley’s guilty

plea.

187

Professor Berger points out that the prejudice hurdle should be “real” but not “insurmountable.”
Berger, supra note 60, at 112.
188
This approach mirrors the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, which determines the
burdens and nature of proof required in proving a Title VII case. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Under this framework, a plaintiff must allege facts that are sufficient to
support a legal claim of discrimination. See id. at 802. The burden of production then shifts to the
employer to rebut the prima facie case by “articulat[ing] some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
the employee’s rejection.” Id. Finally, the employee may prevail only if he can show that the
employer’s defense is false. See id. at 804–05.
189
NEWMAN, supra note 17, at 216 (“In short, the full-blown negotiated plea is not merely an
appeal for mercy; it is an adversary process and the lawyer serves the function of the guilty defendant’s
advocate.”).
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of change is raised, there is naturally fear that it “would multiply the
number of claims and invite rampant second-guessing of trial attorneys.”190
This fear of change is overstated. The plea system generally “rewards
defendants who make such admissions . . . by allowing them . . . to reap the
benefits of reduced sentences.”191 The “reward” of a lower sentence for
accepting a plea incentivizes defendants not to appeal their sentences unless
the process did not function properly.192 Although specific data are not
available, it seems that the system does in fact function properly in the large
majority of cases. Defendants who wish to backtrack in this process and
risk trial while knowing that they are relinquishing the deal they already
received are likely doing so because the system malfunctioned.193 With this
objection to change put into perspective, system legitimacy and
fundamental fairness suggest that a new standard for addressing ineffective
assistance in the guilty plea context should be adopted.
CONCLUSION
In our criminal justice system, the vast majority of defendants plead
guilty. To be valid, a plea must be knowing and voluntary; that standard,
according to the Sixth Amendment, requires that a defendant receive
effective assistance of counsel during the guilty plea process. The volume
of cases and shortage of resources, in addition to other incentives to clear
cases quickly, creates a situation in which ineffective assistance of counsel
is a significant concern.194 The Supreme Court combated ineffective
assistance through the two-prong Strickland test. This test does not
190

Jeffrey Levinson, Note, Don’t Let Sleeping Lawyers Lie: Raising the Standard for Effective
Assistance of Counsel, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 147, 163 (2001).
191
Allison Stephens, Note, A Method to the Madness: The Importance of Proving Prejudice in the
Context of the Guilty Plea, 39 GA. L. REV. 1487, 1517 (2005).
192
For an illustration of this process, see BOGIRA, supra note 20, at 38. (“The defense lawyer
sometimes serves as floor salesperson before the 402, softening up the defendant by stressing the
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translate well from the trial setting to the plea setting because it does not
provide sufficient protection of a defendant’s right to effective counsel.
The prejudice prong presents a nearly insurmountable burden to defendants,
with the result that ineffective assistance may be insulated rather than
remedied.
Further, as this test is applied in Illinois, defendants are unlikely to
succeed on legitimate claims of ineffective assistance, even in cases where
the court agrees that counsel’s performance was deficient, because
defendants must raise a claim of innocence or a defense that is sufficient to
persuade a judge that the defendant was likely to succeed at trial. Not only
does this standard do a disservice to defendants by tipping the scale too far
in favor of reversal proofing guilty pleas, but it also fails to reflect the
realities of what a judge is able to determine from a scant plea-proceeding
record. Further, and most importantly, this standard shifts the court’s focus
from the fundamental fairness of the proceedings to ancillary issues of
innocence that neither the Strickland–Hill standard nor the Constitution
require.
At a minimum, Illinois must realign with the Strickland–Hill prejudice
standard. However, the overall approach to ineffective assistance in the
guilty plea context must be reconsidered and replaced with a standard
designed to address the realities of the guilty plea process.

1737

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

1738

